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Abstract  
This policy brief will discuss the role of local and international technology and innovation policies for low-carbon 
development of the rising middle class in developing countries. Although a large segment of the population of most 
developing countries remains severely deprived, most developing countries also have a significant and growing part 
of the population that could be a feasible target for low-carbon policies.  
In addition to how industrialised countries decide to reduce their emissions, a major determinant of the carbon 
intensity of the world economy and our collective ability to stay below 2°C global mean temperature rise, is how the 
rising middle class in developing countries will develop – along a low-carbon or a higher-carbon pathway. If this rising 
middle class could embark on a lower-carbon consumption pathway, for instance in their electricity use, their 
transportation demand and modes, their eating habits and other consumption patterns, this could structurally avoid 
a considerable amount of greenhouse gas emissions and yield other social, environmental and health benefits.   
As strong carbon policies incentivising such pathways are unlikely to happen soon in developing countries, 
technology policies can provide a solution, given they can be aimed at consumption patterns of the rising middle 
class specifically. This paper makes several case-based recommendations that can put those in developing countries 
that benefit from a more sustainable lifestyle on a low-carbon development path.  
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Introduction 
This policy brief will discuss low-carbon options for the rising middle class in 
developing countries as well as the role of local, national and international technology 
and innovation policies that can contribute to the implementation of such alternative 
pathways. The usual rhetoric around low-carbon development revolves around 
national averages of both incomes and emissions, resulting in policies and measures 
for most developing countries as if the whole population were living in abject poverty. 
However, although a large segment of the population of most developing countries 
remains severely deprived, most developing countries also have a significant and 
growing part of the population that is more affluent.  
The consumption patterns that are emerging in this part of the global population are 
starting to resemble those of the middle class in industrialised countries. For many in 
this rising middle class, now is the time when the decision is made and the conditions 
are created to pursue sustainable, low-carbon lifestyles, or the high-carbon lifestyles 
that many developed countries are socially, behaviourally and technologically locked 
into. Urgent questions include what innovations – social, institutional and 
technological – could lead to a different, environmentally and socially more desirable 
outcome. The focus of this paper is on those currently in the process of reaching 
higher incomes, but the findings could also apply to those already in high-consumption 
and high-carbon lifestyles.  
Two case studies, on energy-efficient lighting and on Bus Rapid Transit (BRT), are taken 
as a basis to explore possible interventions by local and international policymakers 
that can lead to innovations for low-carbon lifestyles. This brief focuses on the urban 
middle class as that is where consumption growth is greatest as well as the potential 
for reducing baseline emissions.  
The rising middle class 
The number of people in the global middle class is projected to increase greatly in the 
years until 2030. If it is defined as daily expenditures from USD2005 10 – 100 based on 
purchasing power parity, as part of the global population the middle class will grow 
from ca. 1.5 billion people in 2009 to almost 5 billion in 2030. The share of the global 
middle class outside of Europe and North America would increase from around 45% in 
2009 to almost 80% in 2030. In terms of middle class consumption, the developing-
world share will increase from a little over 50% to around 70%. It is clear that the rising 
middle class, both in numbers of people and in consumption, lives in non-Annex I 
countries. As consumption is a major driver of CO2 emissions, how the rising middle 
class in developing countries will develop – along a low-carbon or a higher-carbon 
pathway – is a major determinant of the carbon intensity of the world economy and 
our collective ability to stay below 2°C global mean temperature rise over this century.  
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Figure 1: Millions of people in the global middle class split by an approximation of 
industrialised (North America and Europe) and developing (rest of world) countries. 
Source: Kharas, 2010. 
Chakravarty et al. (2009) plot 2030 data on “individual emissions” of CO2, based on 
income distributions and CO2 intensities in countries. Although middle class is usually 
defined over income, their data seem to reveal an emissions-based lower middle class: 
those emitting between 2 and 9.6 tCO2 per person in 2030 (the maximum allowable 
cap for CO2-only per person concluded in this study). Whether a person is in this 
emission-based middle class depends partially on his income, but also on the carbon 
intensity of the country where he lives. Such a CO2-based estimate would mean the 
lower middle class would amount to some 3 billion people in 2030. About 1.2 billion 
people, the rich and the higher middle class, emit more than 9.6 tCO2 per person and 
would be the first candidates for deep emission reductions (Chakravarty et al., 2009), 
but low-carbon policies could also be pursued with the next 4 billion significant 
emitters. Some 3.7 billion people still emit less than 2 tCO2 per person.    
Bottom-up inquiries about energy and CO2 emissions data per individual or household 
reveal great differences based on availability of access to public or non-motorised 
transport modes, climate and geography, surface area, household size and 
consumption characteristics. Studies differ in whether indirect emissions (emissions 
for instance resulting from the manufacture of goods consumed or the refining of fuel 
used) but as a rule of thumb, the total emissions can be around twice the direct 
emissions. Direct emissions consist mainly of transportation, space heating and 
cooling, appliances, hot water and lighting.  
Low-carbon options for the rising urban middle class 
Based on consumption patterns and emission profiles, what are low-carbon options? 
What could a low-carbon lifestyle look like? Table 1 provides a comparison of the 
“business as usual” development as we see it currently developing in growing cities all 
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over the developing world; and as we have already seen it developing in many cities in 
developed countries, with the United States representing of the most high-carbon 
lifestyle.  
Table 1: Elements of business as usual and lower-carbon (urban) lifestyles of the rising 
middle class  
Consumption 
sector 
Business as usual Lower-carbon variant 
Urban planning Sprawling suburbs with mainly road 
connections for access to shops and 
recreation  
Neighbourhoods planned to accommodate 
sustainable transport means and shops and 
recreation within walking distance 
Transportation Private car, several per household Partial modal shift to foot, bicycle and mass 
public transit 
Electric household 
appliances 
Normal-efficiency fridges, washing 
and drying equipment 
High-efficiency fridges, washing and drying 
equipment 
Lighting  Use of incandescent light bulbs Use of high-efficiency LED or CFL lighting 
Cooling Conventional air-conditioners Energy-efficient housing design or 
adaptations, efficient air-conditioners 
Heating Water and space heating using oil, 
gas or electricity 
Energy-efficient and passive-energy housing 
design or adaptations, solar boilers  
Food patterns Daily meat consumption, carb-rich 
diet  
Reduced meat consumption, e.g. to two 
times per week, fresh food 
Consumption 
goods 
One-way use of materials, limited re-
use and recycling, poorly organised 
waste collection and conversion 
Move towards circular economy, extensive 
re-use, recycling and waste reduction, 
waste-to-energy 
 
The lower-carbon options listed in Table 1 are all at different levels in terms of 
mitigation potential, stakeholders involved, costs and institutional complexity of 
implementation. Some would rely more on individual choice while others on 
centralised planning processes, although all can be enabled by good policy. Food 
patterns, for instance, can rely on individual choices but the unsustainability of the 
food system is as much blamed on systemic characteristics and wide-spread 
agricultural practices as on consumption behaviour. Having said that, the table 
attempts to show that many lower-carbon options can be implemented at low costs 
and moderate reduction of comfort levels if organised well, some of which can also 
lead to reduction of wealth-related health problems.  
While discussing the reduced spending on energy, transportation, meat, etc., the so-
called “rebound effect” needs to be taken into account (Sorrell, 2009): that emissions 
due to spending of the saved money on carbon-intensive activities can be 
considerable. No rule-of-thumb number for the rebound effect can be established, as 
the results depend on a range of factors. Studies that have averaged over a large 
number of data sources put the rebound effect at around 30% of the total emissions 
reduced.  
Two case studies (Byrne, 2013; Coninck, 2013) illustrate the specifics of two of the 
options in Table 1. They discussed the specific considerations around CFLs in two 
African countries and BRT in various cities around the world. Both options are 
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surrounded not so much by technological and economic issues, but in particular by 
issues around the political economy and capabilities of their contexts.  
The CFL cases in Kenya and Ghana reveal that the programmes for CFL replacement 
were generally successful but raised a dilemma of on the one hand instituting 
performance standards to allow only high-quality CFLs on the market, and on the 
other allowing local producers to benefit from the programme. In the case of BRT, the 
political economy around the informal public transport that the BRT replaces is 
important: re-employment programmes for former public transport drivers is key. In 
addition, good planning of BRT routes and integration in the general transport system 
is essential.  
In both cases, capacity development plays an important role in the eventual success of 
a measure. For African CFL manufacturers to meet the quality standards, rapid 
capacity development can help. In the case of BRT, the former informal public 
transport drivers need to be re-trained, and capacity for planning BRT routing needs to 
be developed or purchased from international companies.  
A conclusion from the case studies, which can be generalised to other options in Table 
1, is that often-suggested economic policies, such as a carbon tax or a subsidy, cannot 
be expected to suffice for incentivising a change in the carbon development pathways 
for the rising middle class in developing countries. Instruments that take into account 
behaviour, capabilities and the political economy are needed. The next section will 
suggest a number of those. 
Innovation policy interventions 
In many developing countries, strong climate policy instruments such as emissions 
trading or feed-in tariffs are can be difficult to implement. This has a variety of 
reasons: from immature or distorted markets and lack of institutional and technical 
capacity to implement complex policies to politically hard to remove energy subsidies, 
which render subsidising renewable energy unaffordable and energy efficiency policies 
unattractive. Policy interventions in the field of technology and innovation that enable 
lower-carbon pathways for a growing middle class with fast-rising, unsustainable and 
unhealthy consumption patterns. Various literature sources (Ockwell and Mallett, 
2012; Blanco et al., 2012; Byrne et al., 2012; Aubert, 2005) provide insight into policy 
interventions for low-carbon technology, including aimed at the rising middle class in 
developing countries.  
International interventions 
 Spread insights on both the relevance of low-carbon technology and 
innovation policies (including capabilities); it needs to be part of the global 
mind-set as much as putting a price on carbon. Take into account political-
economy aspects in policy considerations. For example, the positive 
opportunities associated with such policies can be placed in the context of 
green growth – new jobs, alongside health and environmental benefits. 
 Agree in the UNFCCC, for instance in the Technology Executive Committee 
(TEC) on internationally on environmental policies and regulations, and in 
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Multilateral Development Banks and/or the Green Climate Fund on provisions 
for financing and assistance to countries with weaker capabilities to 
implement or fund these. International donors and funders could also help 
facilitate regional and global learning from other contexts.  
 The Climate Technology Centre could identify needs for capability 
development as well as the programmes to provide it in countries. The 
CTC&N could also investigate long-term benefits of hit-and run programmes 
like CFL in Kenya and Ghana.  
 International collaborative R&D programmes between developed-country 
research institutions and those in developing countries can be functional in 
building innovation capabilities in developing countries. International 
research funding programmes are necessary for this. They should be set up in 
such a way that they build capabilities and develop low-carbon technologies 
and lifestyles in those areas where specific developing countries have a good 
starting position. Developing country researchers should be enabled to be 
part of international networks.  
 International business could form coalitions around low-carbon options, such 
as BRT systems, in order to make decision-makers aware of the possibilities, 
and create more business.  
National and local interventions 
 Integrate technology policies specifically for low-carbon development in the 
rising middle class in national and urban plans on climate change, spatial 
planning and welfare. For instance, develop urban planning policies that 
enable sustainable lifestyles and Include policies on efficient technical 
appliances but also on behavioural matters such as transportation and food. 
 Develop national innovation plans, and aim innovation ambitions to be 
aligned with strong capabilities in the country or area. Also, identify where 
capabilities can be usefully built up.  
 Develop innovation systems for technologies that can reduce emissions 
relative to a baseline – such as CFLs, LEDs, energy-efficient “wet” and 
electronic appliances, air conditioning and the like. Integrate micro-, meso- 
and macro-level support of the innovation systems.   
 Along with building support for low-carbon technologies and innovations (as 
mentioned in the international interventions), work with local stakeholders 
(or stakeholder groups) to identify where the positive development 
opportunities might lie in exploiting low-carbon innovations. This could, in 
turn, feed into national level needs assessments (such as, but not limited to, 
TNAs) and requests directed to the CTC and/or other low carbon technology 
centres (such as Climate Innovation Centres). 
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